Daniel Gros
Daniel Gros is Director of the
Brussels-based Center for European Policy Studies. He has worked for the
International Monetary Fund, and served as an economic adviser to the
European Commission, the European Parliament, and the French prime
minister and finance minister. He is the editor of Economie… read more
IMF Go Home
BRUSSELS
– The curtains are up on another act of the Greek debt drama. Eurozone
finance ministers and the International Monetary Fund have agreed with
Greece to begin, per the IMF’s demands, providing some debt relief to
the country, and to release €10.3 billion ($11.6 billion) in bailout
funds. Greece, for its part, has agreed to another round of austerity
and structural reform.
Until recently, the
IMF insisted that it would participate in the next Greek rescue program
only if it deemed Greek debt to be sustainable. Based on the IMF’s most
recent debt sustainability analysis,
that is not the case. Germany, however, insisted that the IMF remain on
board – and, with the latest deal, it seems to have prevailed, in
exchange for agreeing to debt relief that it opposed.
The victory may well
not have been worth the sacrifice. In fact, it would have been better to
let the IMF pull out, for two reasons. First, the IMF’s assessments of
debt sustainability in Greece are undermined by a deep conflict of
interest. Second, and more important, IMF credits are too expensive.
In a normal bailout
procedure, the IMF acts as an impartial judge of the troubled country’s
debt sustainability; then, if it so chooses, it can step in as the
lender of last resort. This is what happened in 2010, when the private
sector wanted to flee from Greece and a systemic crisis loomed.
But today Greece has
only a few private-sector obligations. Eurozone governments are the ones
offering large amounts of funding. For its part, the IMF has a large
volume of credits outstanding.
Of course, if
Greece’s creditors accept a haircut, the IMF’s credits would become more
secure – hence the conflict of interest. Indeed, the IMF’s debt
sustainability analysis can hardly be considered neutral, and would
surely be rejected by private-sector actors. A neutral judge – not one
of the creditors – usually sets the terms in insolvency proceedings.
This is not to say
that the IMF’s conclusion is necessarily wrong. In fact, one could
debate the question of Greece’s debt sustainability endlessly. Some
might suspect that Greece’s debt is sustainable, since the Greek
government has to pay less in interest than Portugal or Italy, both of
which have much lower debt levels.
The IMF, however,
argues that, despite these low interest payments, the refinancing needs
of Greece will surpass 15% of GDP (an arbitrary threshold, to be sure)
at some point – perhaps as soon as 15 years. What the IMF fails to
highlight is that, if that happens, it will be primarily because of the
IMF itself – or, more precisely, the high cost of its loans.
The IMF is charging a
much higher interest rate (up to 3.9%) than the Europeans (slightly
above 1%, on average), largely because it has surcharges of up to 300
basis points on its own funding costs, compared to less than 50 basis
points for the European lenders. Moreover, IMF loans are to be repaid in
just 5-7 years, on average, compared to up to 50 years for the European
funding.
The IMF assumes that
its loans will be substituted by private-sector loans at even higher
interest rates (over 6%). This would cause Greece’s debt to snowball,
given that its GDP growth is highly unlikely to achieve such a rate in
the foreseeable future.
The good news is that
there is a simple way to avoid this outcome: replace the IMF’s
expensive short-term funding with cheap long-term European loans. With
that switch, Greek debt may well become sustainable, even by IMF
standards.
Of course, this would
require more funding from the European Stability Mechanism, the
eurozone’s rescue fund. But the ESM would face lower risks, because the
IMF has “super-senior status,” meaning that its loans are supposed to be
repaid first, anyway. (It should be noted that the most senior creditor
usually charges the lowest, not the highest, interest rate, as the IMF
does.)
The savings for
Greece would be huge. Given that the average surcharge on the IMF’s
Greek loans is about 250 basis points, and the IMF has more than €14
billion in outstanding credits, the IMF is extracting huge profits from
Greece – more than €800 million annually since 2013, nearly the
equivalent of the Fund’s yearly operating costs. The IMF is a valuable
global institution, but it should not be financed mainly by Greek
taxpayers (and pre-financed by eurozone taxpayers).
By sending the IMF
packing today, Greece might save several billion euros over the next
decade, with a commensurate reduction in risk for European creditors.
Add to that the IMF’s inability to provide impartial analysis of
Greece’s debt sustainability, and it is hard to see how anyone can argue
that the Fund can make a contribution to the Greek negotiations today.
There is a broader
point as well. Greece is not the only country suffering from the high
cost of IMF loans. The outstanding IMF loans held by Ireland and
Portugal, which amount to another €23 billion, should also be
re-financed. If IMF loans are replaced with ESM financing, eurozone
taxpayers will save hundreds of millions of euros per year.
The IMF’s
participation in the rescue programs for Greece, Ireland, and Portugal
has already cost taxpayers in those countries nearly €9 billion in
excess charges. While that mistake cannot be reversed, it can be
rectified. If it is handled quickly enough, some €4 billion could still
be saved.
A few years ago,
European bodies may not have had the expertise to manage adjustment
programs without the IMF’s guidance. That is no longer true. There is no
good reason to keep the IMF around today – and there are billions of
good reasons to send it home.
No comments:
Post a Comment